Since Alvaro Arré`s presidency, the peace process between the Guatemalan government and URNG has accelerated for several reasons. In particular, the lack of links between him and the military and pressure from the international community and the country`s economy have enabled productive peace negotiations. [6] As part of the President`s peace commitments, he appointed Gustavo Porras Castejan, former head of the URNG-affiliated EJército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), as president of the Country Peace Commission (COPAZ). As part of this organization, URNG and the government continued the ongoing peace talks and signed a series of agreements that resulted in the final peace agreement. [7] The two groups also signed the agreement on 29 March setting out a timetable for the negotiation of a firm and lasting peace. The agreement set a timetable for the continuation of the guatemalan peace speech and negotiations. It set December of the same year as the expected culmination of the process and the signing of a final peace agreement. However, this target was delayed and reached two years after the scheduled date. [5] The lack of constitutional reforms and low turnout show that there is no strong political will in Guatemala and that peace-goers are unable to mobilize voter-friendly voters. Critics often complain that the political debate that preceded the referendum was long, confusing and that public opinion was disillusioned and indifferent to the peace process. In the end, the provisions of the peace agreements still need to be transposed into constitutional law. Otherwise, the government does not have the legal basis to implement reforms and demand significant changes within government. Although some minor provisions of the peace agreement have been implemented, compliance with key parts of the agreement remains low.

Political parties remain divided over the implementation of peace agreements and, as a result, Congress has delayed many proposals before being adopted. Former guerrilla commander Carlos Gonzalez said el Nuevo Diario: “There is no change in the country in the economic, social or political spheres. The transformations are superficial; they are not real, as the peace agreements provide. 5 In addition, considerable pressure has been exerted by international organizations that have provided resources and money to the peace process, many of which depended on the proper implementation of the established agreements. As a result, challenges and the inability to meet parts of the peace agreements have led to budget cuts that make it even more difficult to achieve the promised changes. [10] [8] [11] In the early years of peace talks, particularly between 1991 and 1993, the establishments were seized by internal struggles over reform issues, which became increasingly an integral part of the peace process. Within the military, there have been differences between “hard” and “constitutional defenders,” the former being deeply opposed to discussions with URNG and the latter more open to the negotiation process.